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Abstract
In this chapter, we study some aspects of the problem of stable marriage. There are two
distinguished marriage plans: the fully transferable case, where money can be transferred
between the participants, and the fully nontransferable case where each participant has its
own rigid preference list regarding the other gender. We continue to discuss intermediate
partial transferable cases. Partial transferable plans can be approached as either special
cases of cooperative games using the notion of a core or as a generalization of the cyclical
monotonicity property of the fully transferable case (fake promises). We introduce these
two approaches and prove the existence of stable marriage for the fully transferable and
nontransferable plans. The marriage problem is a special case of more general assignment
problems, which has many application in mathematical economy and logistics, in partic-
ular, the assignment of employees to hiring firms. The fully cooperative marriage plan is
also a special case of the celebrated problem of optimal mass transport, which is also
known as Monge-Kantorovich theory. Optimal transport problem has countless applica-
tions in many fields of mathematics, physics, computer science and, of course, economy,
transportation and traffic control.
Keywords: cyclic monotonicity, core, cooperative games, Monge-Kantorovich
1. Introduction
Consider two sets Im, Iw ofN elements each. We may think about Im as a set of men and Iw as
a set of women. We denote a man in Im by i and a woman in Iw by i
0.
A marriage plan (MP) is a bijection which assign to each man in Im a unique woman in Iw (and
v.v). A matching of a man i∈ Im to a woman j
0
∈ Iw is denoted by ij
0. The set of all such
matchings is isomorphic to the set of permutations on 1;…Nf g. Evidently, we can arrange the
order according to a given marriage plan and represent this plan as ii0f g; i ¼ 1…N.
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative
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The MP ii0f g is called stable if and only if there are no blocking pairs. A blocking pair is
composed of a man i and a woman j 0 6¼ i0 such that both i prefers j 0 over his assigned woman
i0 and j 0 prefers i over her assigned man j.
To complete this definition, we have to establish a criterion of preferences over the possible
matchings in Im  Iw.
Let us consider two extreme cases. The first is the fully transferable (FT) case [1–4]. Here we
assume a utility value θij 0 for a potential matching ij
0. If ij 0 are matched, they can split this
reward θij 0 between themselves as they wish.
The second case is fully non-transferable (FNT) [5–7]. This involves no utility value (and no
money reward). Each participant (man or woman) lists the set of participants of the other
gender according to a preference list: For each man i∈ Im, there exists an order relation ≻ i on
Im, such that j
0
≻ ik
0 means that the man i will prefer the woman j 0 over the woman k0.
Likewise, each woman i0 ∈ Iw have its own order relation ≻ i0 over Im.
These two notions seem very different, and indeed they are, not only because the first one
seems to defines the preference in materialistic terms and the second hints on “true love.” In
fact, we can quantify the nontransferable case as well: There may be a reward θmij 0 for a man i
marrying a woman j 0, such that j 0 ≻ ik
0 iff θmij 0 > θ
m
ik0 . Likewise, θ
w
ij 0 quantifies the reward the the
woman j 0 obtains while marrying the man i.
Given a matching ii0f g, a blocking pair in the FNT case is a pair ij 0, j 0 6¼ i0 such that the man i
prefers the woman j 0 over his matched woman i0 (i.e., j 0 ≻ ii
0, or θmij 0 > θ
m
ii0 ) and the woman j
0
prefers i over her matched man j (j≻ i0 i, or θ
w
ij 0 > θ
w
jj 0 ). Thus, a blocking pair ij
0 is defined by
min θmij 0  θ
m
ii0 ; θ
w
ij 0  θ
w
jj 0
n o
> 0 (1)
Definition 1.1. The matching ii;f g is stable if and only if
min θmij 0  θ
m
ii0 ; θ
w
ij 0  θ
w
jj 0
n o
≤ 0
for any i, j∈ Im and i
0, j 0 ∈ Iw.
Let
θij 0 ≔θ
m
ij 0 þ θ
w
ij 0 : (2)
Definition 1.1 implies that the condition
θii0 þ θjj 0 ≥θij 0 þ θji0 (3)
is necessary for all i, j for the stability of ii0f g in the FNT case.
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Let us consider now the fully transferable (FT) case. Here a married pair ii0 can share the
rewards θii0 for their marriage. Suppose the man i cuts ui and the woman i
0 cuts vi0 form their
mutual reward θii0 . Evidently, ui þ vi0 ¼ θii0 . If
ui þ vj 0 < θij 0 (4)
for some j 0 6¼ i0 then ij 0 is a blocking pair, since both i and j 0 can increase their cuts to match the
mutual reward θij 0 . Hence
θij 0 þ θji0 > ui þ vj 0 þ uj þ vi0 ¼ θii0 þ θjj 0
so (3) is a necessary condition for the stability in the FT case as well.
Evidently, condition (3) is not a sufficient one, unless N ¼ 2 in the FT case.
A simple example (N ¼ 2):
θ
m w1 w2 θ
w w1 w2
m1 1 0 ; m1 1 5
m2 0 1 m2 0 1
The matching 110; 220f g is FNT stable. Indeed θm110 ¼ 1 > θ
m
120 ¼ 0 while θ
m
220 ¼ 1 >
θ
m
210 ¼ 0, so both men are happy, and this is enough for FNT stability, since that neither
120f g nor 210f g is a blocking pair. On the other hand, if the married pairs share their
rewards θij 0 ¼ θ
m
ij 0 þ θ
w
ij 0 we get
θ w1 w2
m1 2 5
m2 0 2
so
θ110 þ θ220 ¼ 4 < 5 ¼ θ120 þ θ210 ,
thus 210; 120f g is the stable marriage in the FT case.
However, we may extend the necessary condition (3) in the FT case as follows:
Consider the couples i1i
0
1,…iki
0
k, k ≥ 2. The sum of the rewards for these couples is
Pk
l¼1 θili
0
l
.
Suppose they perform a” chain deal” such that man il marries woman i
0
lþ1 for 1 ≤ l ≤ k 1, and
the last man ik marries the first woman i
0
1. The net reward for the new matching is
Pk1
l¼1 θili
0
lþ1
þ θiki01 .
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This leads to a definition of a blocking chain:
Definition 1.2. A chain i1i
0
1,…iki
0
k of married couples forms a blocking chain iff
Xk
l¼1
θil i
0
lþ1
 θili0l
 
> 0 (5)
where i0kþ1≔ i
0
1. If there are no blocking chains then the matching ii
0f g is called cyclically monotone [8].
The notion of a blocking chain extends the condition (4) from k ¼ 2 to k ≥ 2. It turns that it is
also necessary condition for the stability in the fully transferable case:
Proposition 1.1. If a marriage ii0f g is a stable one for the FT case then it is cyclically monotone.
Proof. Let ii0f g be a matching, such that ui is the cut of man i marrying i
0 and vi0 the cut of the
woman i0 marrying i. Suppose by negation that i1i
0
1…iki
0
k is a blocking chain. Since ui þ vi0 ≤θii0
we obtain
Xk
l¼1
θil i
0
lþ1
>
Xk
l¼1
θili
0
l
≥
Xk
l¼1
uil þ vi0l
 
¼
Xk
l¼1
uil þ vi0lþ1
 
so, in particular, there exists a pair ili
0
lþ1 for which θili0lþ1 > uil þ vi
0
lþ1
. Hence ili
0
lþ1 is a blocking
pair via (4). ⃞
We shall see later on that cyclical monotonicity is, actually, an equivalent definition to stability in
the FT case.
The notion of cyclical monotonicity implies an additional level of cooperation for the marriage
game. Not only the married pair share their utility between themselves via (2), but also
different couples are ready to share their reward via a chain deal according to Definition 1.2.
If the total reward after the chain exchange exceeds their reward prior to this deal, the lucky
ones are ready to share their reward with the unlucky and compensate their losses.
What about the FNT case? Of course there is no point talking about a “chain deal” in that case.
However, we may define a “FNT blocking chain” i1i
0
1…iki
0
k by
max
1 ≤ l ≤ k
min θmil i0lþ1
 θmili0l
;θ
w
ili
0
lþ1
 θwili0l
n o
> 0 (6)
where, again, i0kþ1  i
0
1. Definition 1.1 is analogs to the statement that that there are no blocking
chains of this form. Thus, a marriage ii0f g is stable in the FNT case if and only if
max
1 ≤ l ≤ k
min θmil i0lþ1
 θmili0l
;θ
w
ili
0
lþ1
 θwili0l
n o
≤ 0 (7)
for any chain deal i1i
0
1…iki
0
k.
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At the first sight, definition (7) seems redundant, since it provides no further information.
However, we can observe the analogy between (5) and (7). In fact, (7) and (5) are obtained
from each other by the exchanges
θili
0
lþ1
 θil i0l ⇔min θ
m
ili
0
lþ1
 θmil i0l
;θ
w
ili
0
lþ1
 θwili0l
n o
and
Xk
1
⇔ max
1 ≤ i ≤ k
(8)
In Section 2.2, we take advantage on this representation.
2. Partial sharing
Here we present two possible definitions of intermediate marriage game which interpolate
between the fully transferable and the non transferable case. The first is based on the notion of
core of a cooperative game, and the second is based on cyclic monotonicity.
2.1. Stable marriage as a cooperative game
This part follows some of the ideas in Galichon et al. and references therein1 [9]. See also [10].
Assume that we can guarantee a cut ui for each married man i, and a cut vj 0 for each married
woman j 0. In order to define a stable marriage we have to impose some conditions which will
guarantee that no man or woman can increase his or her cut by marrying a different partner.
For this let us define, for each pair ij 0, a pairwise bargaining set F ij 0ð Þ⊂R2 which contains all
possible cuts ui; vj 0
 
for a matching of man i with woman j 0.
Assumption 2.1
i. For each i∈ Im and j
0
∈ Iw, F ij
0ð Þ are closed sets in R2, equal to the closure of their
interior. Let F 0 ij
0ð Þ the interior of F ij 0ð Þ.
ii. F ij 0ð Þ is monotone in the following sense: If u; vð Þ∈F ij 0ð Þ then u0; ; v0ð Þ∈F ij 0ð Þwhenever
u0 ≤u and v0 ≤ v.
iii. There exist C1, C2 ∈R such that
u; vð Þ;max u; vð Þ ≤C2f g⊂F ij
0ð Þ⊂ u; vð Þ; uþ v ≤C1f g
for any i∈ Im, j∈ Iw.
1
which was turned to my attention by R. McCann.
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The meaning of the feasibility set is as follows:
Any married couple ij 0 ∈ Im  Iw can guarantee the cut u for i and v for j
0, provided
u; vð Þ∈F ij 0ð Þ.
Definition 2.1. The feasibility set V Fð Þ⊂R2N is composed of all vectors u1;…uN; v1;…vNð Þ which
satisfies
ui; vj 0
 
∈R
2  F 0 ij
0ð Þ
for any ij 0 ∈ Im  Iw
The marriage plan ii0f g is stable if and only if there exists u1;…vNð Þ∈V Fð Þ such that ui; vi0ð Þ∈F ii
0ð Þ
for any i∈ 1;…Nf g.
The FNT case is contained in definition 2.1, where
F ij 0ð Þ≔ u ≤θmij 0 ; v ≤θ
w
ij 0
n o
: (9)
Indeed, if ii0f g is a stable marriage plan let ui ¼ θ
m
ii0 and vi0 ¼ θ
w
ii0 . Then u1;…vNð Þ satisfies
ui; vi0ð Þ∈F for any i∈ 1…Nf g. Since there are no blocking pairs if follows that for any j
0 6¼ i0,
either θmij 0 > θii0 ¼ ui or θ
w
ij 0 > θ
w
jj 0 ¼ vj 0 , hence ui; vj 0
 
∈R
2  F 0 ij
0ð Þ so u1…vNð Þ∈V Fð Þ
(Figure 1a).
The FT case (Figure 1b) is obtained by
F ij 0ð Þ≔ u; vð Þ; uþ v ≤θij 0
n o
: (10)
Indeed, if ii0f g is a stable marriage plan and u1;…vNð Þ are the corresponding cuts satisfying
ui þ vj 0 ¼ θij 0 , then for each j
0 6¼ i0 we obtain ui þ vj 0 ≥θij 0 (otherwise ij
0 is a blocking pair). This
implies that ui; vj 0
 
∈R
2  F 0 ij
0ð Þ.
There are other sensible models of partial transferswhich fit into the formalism of Definition 2.1
and Theorem 3.1. Let us consider several examples:
1. Transferable marriages restricted to non-negative cuts: In the transferable case, the feasibility
sets may contain negative cuts for the man u or for the woman v (even though not for both,
if it is assumed θij 0 > 0). To avoid the undesired stable marriages were one of the partners
get a negative cut, we may replace the feasibility set (10) by
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F ij 0ð Þ≔ u; vð Þ∈R2; uþ v ≤θij 0 ;max u; vð Þ ≤θij 0
n o
,
see Figure 1c. It can be easily verified that if u1;…vNð Þ∈V Fð Þ contains negative compo-
nents, then u1½ þ;… vN½ þ
 
, obtained by replacing the negative components by 0, is in V Fð Þ
as well. Thus, the core of this game contains vectors in V Fð Þ of non-negative elements.
2. In the transferable case (10), we allowed both men and women to transfer money to their
partner. Indeed, we assumed that the man’s i cut is θmij 0  w and the woman’s j cut is
θwij 0 þ w, where w∈R. Suppose we wish to allow only transfer between men to women, so
we insist on w ≥ 0. In that case, we choose (Figure 1d)
F ij 0ð Þ≔ u; vð Þ∈R2; uþ v ≤θij 0 ; u ≤θ
m
ij 0
n o
: (11)
3. Let us assume that the transfer w from man i to woman j 0 is taxed, and the tax depends on
i, j 0. Thus, if man i transfers w > 0 to a woman j 0 he reduces his cut by w, but the woman
cut is increased by an amount βi, jw, were βi, j ∈ 0; 1½ . Here 1 βi, j is the tax implied for this
transfer. It follows that
ui ≤θ
m
ij 0  w; vj 0 ≤θ
w
ij 0 þ βi, jw, w ≥ 0
Figure 1. Pairwise bargaining sets.
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Hence
F ij 0ð Þ≔ u; vð Þ∈R2; ui þ β
1
i, j vj 0 ≤θ
β
ij 0
; ui ≤θ
m
ij 0
n o
,
where θ
β
ij 0
≔θmij 0 þ β
1
i, j θ
w
ij 0 . The geometrical description of F us as in Figure 1d, where the
dashed line is tilted.
2.2. Stability by fake promises
Suppose a man can make a promise to a married woman (which is not his wife), and vice
versa. The principle behind it is that each of them does not intend to honor his/her own
promise, but, nevertheless, believes that the other party will honor hers/his. It is also based on
both partial sharing inside a married pair, as well as some collaboration between the pairs.
Define
Δ
qð Þ i; j 0ð Þ≔min
q θmij 0  θ
m
ii0
 
þ θwij 0  θ
w
jj 0
qðθwij 0  θ
w
jj 0 þ θ
m
ij 0  θ
m
ii0
8<
:
9=
;, (12)
where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. In particular
Δ
0ð Þ i; j 0ð Þ≔min θmij 0  θ
m
ii0 ;θ
w
ij 0  θ
w
j 0j 0
n o
Δ
1ð Þ i; j 0ð Þ≔θmij 0  θ
m
ii0 þ θ
w
ij 0  θ
w
ii0  θij 0  θii0 :
The value of q represents the level of internal sharing inside the couple. Thus, q ¼ 0 means there
is no sharing whatsoever, and the condition Δ 0ð Þ i; j 0ð Þ > 0 for a blocking pairs implies that both
i and j 0 gains from the exchange, is displayed in (6).
On the other hand, Δ 1ð Þ i; j 0ð Þ þ Δ 1ð Þ j; i0ð Þ > 0, namely
θii0 þ θjj 0 < θij 0 þ θji0
is, as we argued, a necessary condition for a blocking pair in FT case, where θ represents the
sum of the rewards to of the pair via (2).
We now consider an additional parameter p∈ 0; 1½  and define the real valued function on R:
x↦ x½ p≔ x½ þ  p x½  (13)
Note that x½ p ¼ x for any p if x ≥ 0, while x½ 1 ¼ x for any real x. The parameter p represents the
level of sharing between the pairs.
Definition 2.2. Let 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1. The matching ii0f g is p; qð Þ stable if for any k∈N and
i1, i2,…ik ∈ 1;…Nf g
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Xk
l¼1
Δ
qð Þ il; i
0
lþ1
 h i
p
≤ 0where ikþ1 ¼ i1
where ikþ1≔ i1.
Note that p ¼ 0 implies that Δ qð Þ i; j 0ð Þ ≤ 0 for any j 0 6¼ i0. If, in addition, q ¼ 0 then this inequality
implies that i0j0 is not a blocking pair in the FNT case.
On the other hand, p ¼ 1 implies
Xk
l¼1
Δ
qð Þ il; i
0
lþ1
 
≤ 0where
which is reduced to (5) if q ¼ 1 as well.
Let us interpret the meaning of q, p in the context of utility exchange. A man i∈ Im can offer
some bribe w to any other women j 0 he might be interested in (except his own wife, so j 0 6¼ i0).
His cut for marrying j 0 is now θmij 0  w. The cut of the woman j
0 should have been θwij 0 þ w.
However, the happy woman has to pay some tax for accepting this bribe. Let q∈ 0; 1½  be the
fraction of the bribe she can get (after paying her tax). Her supposed cut for marrying i is just
θ
w
ij 0 þ qw. Woman j
0 will believe and accept offer from man i if two conditions are satisfied: the
offer should be both
1. Competitive, namely θwij 0 þ qw ≥θ
w
j 0j 0.
2. Trusted, if woman j 0 believes that man i is motivated. This implies θmij 0  w ≥θ
m
ii0 .
The two conditions above can be satisfied, and the offer is acceptable, only if
q θmij 0  θ
m
ii0
 
þ θwij 0  θ
w
jj 0 > 0: (14)
Symmetrically, man i will accept an offer from a woman j 0 6¼ i0 only if
q θwij 0  θ
w
ii0
 
þ θmij 0  θ
m
jj 0 > 0: (15)
The utility of the exchange ii0 to ij 0 is, then defined by the minimum Δ qð Þ i; j 0ð Þ of (14, 15) via (12).
To understand the role of p, consider the chain of pairs exchanges
i1i
0
1 ! i1i
0
2
 
,… ik1i
0
k1 ! ik1i
0
k
 
, iki
0
k
 
! iki
0
1
 
:
Each of the pair exchange il; ilð Þ ! il; ilþ1ð Þ yields a utility Δ
qð Þ il; i
0
lþ1
 
for the new pair. The
lucky new pairs in this chain of couples exchange are those who makes a positive reward. The
unfortunate new pairs are those who suffer a loss (negative reward). The lucky pairs, whose
interest is to activate this chain, are ready to compensate the unfortunate ones by contributing
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some of their gained utility. The chain will be activated (and the original marriages will break
down) if the mutual contribution of the fortunate pairs is enough to cover at least the p part of
the mutually loss of utility of the unfortunate pairs. This is the condition
X
Δ
qð Þ il;i
0
lþ1ð Þ>0
Δ
qð Þ il; i
0
lþ1
 
þ p
X
Δ
qð Þ il;i
0
lþ1ð Þ<0
Δ
qð Þ il; i
0
lþ1
 

Xk
l¼1
Δ
qð Þ il; i
0
lþ1
 h i
p
> 0:
Stability by Definition 2.2 grantees that no such chain is activated.
3. Existence of stable marriage plans
In the general case of Assumption 2.1, the existence of a stable matching follows from the
following Theorem:
Theorem 3.1. Let W Fð Þ⊂R2N defined as follows:
u1;…uN; v1;…vNð Þ∈W Fð Þ,
⇔ ∃ an injection τ : Im ! Iw such that ui; vi0ð Þ∈F ii
0ð Þ where i0 ¼ τ ið Þ, ∀i∈ Im: Then there
exists u1;…uN; v1;…vNð Þ∈W Fð Þ such that
ui; vj 0
 
∈R
2  F 0 ij
0ð Þ (16)
for any i; j 0ð Þ∈ Im  Iw.
The set of vectors in W Fð Þ satisfying (16) is called the core. Note that the core is identified with
the set of R2N vector in V Fð Þ which satisfy the condition ui; vi0ð Þ∈F ii
0ð Þ. Hence Definition 2.1
can be recognized as the nonemptiness of the core, which is equivalent to the existence of a
stable matching.
Theorem 3.1 is, in fact, a special case of the celebrated Theorem of Scarf [11] for cooperative
games, tailored to the marriage scenario (see also [12, 13]). As we saw, it can be applied to the
fully nontransferable case (9), as well as to the fully transferable case (10).
Theorem 3.1 implies, in particular, the existence of stable marriage in the FNT case
corresponding to p ¼ q ¼ 0 or (9), as well as for the FT case corresponding to p ¼ q ¼ 1 or (10).
3.1. Gale-Shapley algorithm in the non-transferable case
Here we describe the celebrated, constructive algorithm due to Gale and Shapley [5].
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1. At the first stage, each man i∈ Im proposes to the woman j∈ Iw at the top of his list. At the
end of this stage, some women got proposals (possibly more than one), other women may
not get any proposal.
2. At the second stage, each woman who got more than one proposal binds the man whose
proposal is most preferable according to her list (who is now engaged). She releases all the
other men who proposed. At the end of this stage, the men’s set Im is composed of two
parts: engaged and released.
3. At the next stage, each released man makes a proposal to the next woman in his preference
list (whenever she is engaged or not).
4. Back to stage 2.
It is easy to verify that this process must end at a finite number of steps. At the end of this
process, all women and men are engaged. This is a stable matching!
Of course, we could reverse the role of men and women in this algorithm. In both cases, we get
a stable matching. The algorithm we indicated is the one which is best from the men’s point of
view. In the case where the women propose, the result is best for the women. In fact.
Theorem 3.2. [14] For any NTstable matching ii0f g, the rank of the woman i0 according to man i is at
most the rank of the woman matched to i by the above, men proposing algorithm.
3.2. Variational formulation in the fully transferable case
There are several equivalent definitions of stable marriage plan in the FT case. Here we
introduces two of these.
Recall that if F is given by (11) the feasibility set V Fð Þ (Definition 2.1) takes the form
V Fð Þ≔ u1;…vNð Þ∈R
2N
; ui þ vj 0 ≥θij 0 ∀ij
0
∈ Im  Iw
n o
: (17)
Recall also Definition 1.2 for cyclical monotonicity.
Theorem 3.3 ii0f g is a stable marriage plan in the FT case if and only if one of the following equivalent
conditions is satisfied:
• Efficiency (or maximal public utility):
PN
i¼1 θii0 ≥
PN
i¼1 θiσ ið Þ for any marriage plans
σ : Im ! Iw.
• ii0f g is cyclically monotone.
• Optimality: The minimal sum
PN
1 u
0
i þ v
0
i of cuts in the feasibility set (17) satisfies
u0i þ v
0
i0
¼ θii0 (i.e., u
0
1;…v
0
N
 
is in the core).
The efficiency characterization of stable marriage connects this notion with optimal transport
and the celebrated Monge Kantorovich theory [15–17]. See also [18].
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Since the set of all bijections is finite and the maximum on a finite set is always achieved, we
obtain from the efficiency characterization.
Corollary 3.1. There always exists a stable marriage plan in the FT case.
Remark 3.1 As far as we know, the fully transferable case (17) is the only case whose stable marriages
are obtained by a variational argument.
Proof. (of theorems 3.3) In Proposition 1.1, we obtained that FT stability implies cyclical monotonic-
ity.We now prove that cyclical monotonicity implies efficiency. The proof follows the idea published
originally by Afriat [19] and was introduced recently in a much simpler form by Brezis [20].
Let
u0i ≔ inf
kchains, k∈N
Xk1
l¼1
θili
0
l
 θili
0
lþ1
 !
þ θiki
0
k
 θiki
0 : (18)
Let α > u0i and consider a k chain realizing
α >
Xk1
l¼1
θili
0
l
 θil i
0
lþ1
 !
þ θik i
0
k
 θiki
0 (19)
By cyclic monotonicity,
Pk
l¼1 θili
0
l
 θili
0
lþ1
≥ 0. Since i0kþ1 ¼ i
0
1,
Xk1
l¼1
θili
0
l
 θili
0
lþ1
≥θiki
0
1
 θiki
0
k
so (19) implies
α > θik , i
0
1
 θik , i
0 ≥ 0,
in particular u0i < ∞.
Hence, for any j∈ Im
αþ θii0  θij 0 >
Xk1
l¼1
θil, i
0
l
 θil , i
0
lþ1
 !
þ θiki
0
k
 θik i
0 þ θii0  θij 0 ≥  u
0
j
(20)
where the last inequality follows by the substitution of the kþ 1 cycle i1 ¼ i, i2,…, ik, ikþ1 ¼ i
in (18). Since α is any number bigger than u0i it follows
u0i þ θii0  θij 0 ≥  u
0
j , (21)
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for any pair i, j∈ Im. Now, let σ be any permutation in Im and let j ¼ σ ið Þ. Then
u0i þ θii0  θiσ i0ð Þ ≥  u
0
σ ið Þ: (22)
Since σ is a bijection on Im as well, so Σ
N
i¼1u
0
i ¼
PN
i¼1 u
0
σ ið Þ. Then, sum (22) over 1 ≤ i ≤N to obtain
XN
i¼1
θii0 ≥
XN
i¼1
θiσ i0ð Þ,
so ii0f g is an efficient marriage plan.
To prove that any efficient solution is stable, we define v0j ≔θjj 0  u
0
j so
u0j þ v
0
j 0 ¼ θjj 0 : (23)
Then (21) implies
u0i þ v
0
j 0 ¼ u
0
i þ θjj 0  u
0
j ≥u
0
i  u
0
i þ θij 0 ¼ θij 0 (24)
for any i, j. Thus, (23, 24) establish that ii0f g is a stable marriage via Definition 2.1.
Finally, the optimality condition follows immediately from the definition of the feasibility set
XN
1
ui þ vi0 ¼
XN
1
ui þ vσ ið Þ ≥
XN
1
θiσ ið Þ
for any bijection σ : Im ! Iw and from (23). ⃞
3.3. On existence and nonexistence of stable fake promises
Theorem 3.4 If the matching ii 0f g is p; qð Þ stable, then it is also p0; q0ð Þ stable for p0 ≥ p and q0 ≤ q.
The proof of this Theorem follows from the definitions (12, 13) and the following.
Lemma 3.1. For any, i 6¼ j and 1 ≥ q > q0 ≥ 0,
1þ qð Þ1Δ qð Þ i; jð Þ > 1þ q0ð Þ
1
Δ
q0ð Þ i; jð Þ:
Proof. For a, b∈R and r∈ 0; 1½  define
Δr a; bð Þ≔
1
2
aþ bð Þ 
r
2
∣a b∣:
Observe that Δ1 a; bð Þ  min a; bð Þ. In addition, r↦Δr a; bð Þ is monotone not increasing in r. A
straightforward calculation yields
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min qaþ b; qbþ að Þ ¼ Δ1 qaþ b; qbþ að Þ ¼ qþ 1ð ÞΔ1q
1þq
a; bð Þ,
and the Lemma follows from the above observation, upon inserting a ¼ θm i; jð Þ  θm i; ið Þ and
b ¼ θw i; jð Þ  θw j; jð Þ. ⃞
What can be said about the existence of s p; qð Þ stable matching in the general case? Unfortu-
nately, we can prove now only a negative result:
Proposition 3.1. For any 1 ≥ q > p ≥ 0, a stable marriage does not exist unconditionally.
Proof. We only need to present a counter-example. So, let N ¼ 2. To show that the matching
110, 220 is not stable we have to show
Δ
qð Þ 1; 20ð Þ
h i
p
þ Δ qð Þ 2; 10ð Þ
h i
p
> 0 (25)
while, to show that 120, 210 is not stable we have to show
Δ
qð Þ 1; 10ð Þ
h i
p
þ Δ qð Þ 2; 20ð Þ
h i
p
> 0: (26)
By definition (12) and Lemma 3.1
Δ
qð Þ 1; 20ð Þ ¼ qþ 1ð ÞΔr θ
m
120  θ
m
110 ;θ
w
120  θ
w
220
 
Δ
qð Þ 2; 10ð Þ ¼ qþ 1ð ÞΔr θ
m
210  θ
m
220 ;θ
w
210  θ
w
110
 
where r ¼ 1q1þq. To obtain Δ
qð Þ 1; 10ð Þ,Δ qð Þ 2; 20ð Þ we just have to exchange man 1 with man 2, so
Δ
qð Þ 2; 20ð Þ ¼ qþ 1ð ÞΔr θ
m
220  θ
m
210 ;θ
w
220  θ
w
120
 
Δ
qð Þ 1; 10ð Þ ¼ qþ 1ð ÞΔr θ
m
110  θ
m
120 ;θ
w
110  θ
w
210
 
:
All in all, we only have four parameters to play with:
a1≔θ
m
120  θ
m
110 , a2 ¼ θ
w
120  θ
w
220 ,
b1 ¼ θ
m
210  θ
m
220 , b2 ¼ θ
w
210  θ
w
110 ,
so the two conditions to be verified are
Δr a1; a2ð Þ½ p þ Δr b1; b2ð Þ½ p > 0; Δr a1;b2ð Þ½ p þ Δr b1;a2ð Þ½ p > 0:
Let us insert a1 ¼ a2≔ a > 0. b1 ¼ b2≔  b where b > 0. So
Δr a1; a1ð Þ½ p ¼ a, Δr b1; b2ð Þ½ p ¼ pb,
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while Δr a1;b2ð Þ ¼ Δr b1;a2ð Þ ¼
ba
2 
r
2 aþ bð Þ. In particular, the condition
a
b <
1r
1þr implies
Δr a1;b2ð Þ½ p ¼ Δr b1;a2ð Þ½ p > 0 which verifies (26). On the other hand, if a pb > 0 then
(25) is verified. Both conditions can be verified if 1r1þr > p. Recalling q ¼
1r
1þr we obtain the result.
Conjecture 1 If 0 < p < q < 1 then there always exists a p; qð Þ stable marriage (c.f. Figure 2).
4. Conclusions
We considered several paradigms of marriage plans between two sets of different genders and
the same cardinality. In particular, the extreme cases of completely transferable and completely
nontransferable marriage plans. In the completely transferable case, we proved that all stable
matching are obtained by an optimization which maximizes the sum of the rewards of the
participants. In the completely nontransferable case, the stable marriage plane is obtained as a
result of a constructive algorithm due to Gale and Shapley.
We also introduced two paradigms for partially transferable marriage plans. The first para-
digm is based on a special case of cooperative coalition games, and quoted (without a proof)
the theorem on existence of a stable marriage plan in that setting. The second paradigm is
based on extending the notion of cyclical monotonicity which characterizes the fully transfer-
able case. The existence of stable marriage plan in the intermediate cases of the second parad-
igm is still an open problem.
The marriage problem is a special case of more general assignment problems which has many
application in mathematical economy and logistics. In general, the two sets of men and women
can be replaced by two sets of any number of agents (e.g., firms and employees), and the 1–1
assignment in the marriage case be replaced by any number to one assignments (e.g., several
employees to a given firm), allowing also the possibility of unemployment. Both paradigms
introduced in this paper can be extended to include these more general cases.
Figure 2. Conjecture: Is there an unconditional existence of stable marriages in the gray area?
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From another point of view, the fully cooperative marriage plan is also a special case of the
celebrated problem of optimal mass transport, also known as Monge-Kantorovich theory, after
the French mathematician Monge who lived in Napoleon’s time, and the soviet mathematician
Kantorovich who won the Nobel prize in Economics in 1975. Optimal transport problem has
countless applications in many fields such as mathematics, physics, computer science and, of
course, economy, transportation, and traffic control.
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